Abstract: Trust in reciprocity (TR) is defined as the risky decision to invest valued resources in another party with the hope of mutual benefit. Several fMRI studies have investigated the neural correlates of TR in one-shot and multiround versions of the investment game (IG). However, an overall characterization of the underlying neural networks remains elusive. Here, a coordinate-based meta-analysis was employed (activation likelihood estimation method, 30 articles) to investigate consistent brain activations in each of the IG stages (i.e., the trust, reciprocity and feedback stage). Results showed consistent activations in the anterior insula (AI) during trust decisions in the one-shot IG and decisions to reciprocate in the multiround IG, likely related to representations of aversive feelings. Moreover, decisions to reciprocate also consistently engaged the intraparietal sulcus, probably involved in evaluations of the reciprocity options. On the contrary, trust decisions in the multiround IG consistently activated the ventral striatum, likely associated with reward prediction error signals. Finally, the dorsal striatum was found consistently recruited during the feedback stage of the multiround IG, likely related to reinforcement learning. In conclusion, our results indicate different neural networks underlying trust, reciprocity, and feedback learning. These findings suggest that although decisions to trust and reciprocate may elicit aversive feelings likely evoked by the uncertainty about the decision outcomes and the Gabriele Bellucci and Sergey V. Chernyak contributed equally to this work The authors are unaware of any conflicts of interest, financial or otherwise.
INTRODUCTION
The Scottish philosopher of the Enlightenment David Hume argued that trust and reciprocity are essential for stable societies [Hume, 1998 [Hume, , 2000 . Indeed, trust is pervasive in our social lives (e.g., in friendships, romantic relationships) and cooperation depends to a large extent on trustful behavior and trustworthy cooperators. There are at least three constructs of trust [Suzuki et al., 2015] : subjective trust, which refers to the perception or evaluation of others as trustworthy [e.g., facial judgments; Bzdok et al., 2012; Singer et al., 2004] ; antecedents of trust, which describe psychological precursors leading to trusting behavior [e.g., truth-telling, Rode, 2010; Suzuki et al., 2015] ; and finally, behavioral trust, which captures an overt behavior reflecting trust [e.g., decisions to trust, Berg et al., 1995] .
A well-known economic exchange paradigm, the investment game (IG, also known as the "Trust Game") [Berg et al., 1995] is believed to measure behavioral trust, specifically, trust in reciprocity (TR). TR is defined as a risky decision to invest valued resources in another party with the hope of mutual benefit [Fehr, 2009; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Kramer, 1999; Meyerson et al., 1996; Zak and Knack, 2001] . In the standard IG, two players receive an endowment and are assigned either the role of a trustor (investor) or a trustee. The trustor may choose either to trust, that is, pass any portion of the endowment to the trustee while keeping the rest, or to distrust by sharing no money (trust stage). If the trustor shares, the money is multiplied (usually tripled) by the experimenter and passed on to the trustee. The trustee can now reciprocate, that is, pass any portion of the money back to the trustor while keeping the rest, or betray by keeping the entire amount (reciprocity stage). At the end of the game, the trustor is informed about the trustee's decision and the overall gains (feedback stage). Generally, the amount of money passed by the trustor captures trust, whereas the amount returned by the trustee captures reciprocity [Berg et al., 1995; Camerer, 2003b; Chaudhuri and Gangadharan, 2007; Csuk as et al., 2008] .
Economic theories, which define human behavior as driven by self-regarding preferences aiming at maximizing personal utilities, predict that neither trustors nor trustees should send any amount of money [Camerer and Weigelt, 1988; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003] . Indeed, the trustor may lose the amount of money she decides to send if the trustee defects and defection is highly desirable for the trustee since it yields him the highest outcome [Camerer and Weigelt, 1988; Fouragnan et al., 2013] . However, empirical studies have shown that trustors invest more than half of their initial endowment and trustees split the amount of money they received evenly [Camerer, 2003a; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Johnson and Mislin, 2011] . Although under some circumstances, (e.g., in iterated encounters like in the multiround IG), such a cooperative behavior may be explained with classical economic accounts (e.g., trustors and trustees may behave cooperatively to maximize their personal gains); contrary to the predictions of economic theories, trustors and trustees cooperate also in contexts in which no strategic behavior is possible (e.g., when they interact only once as in the oneshot IG). Thus, self-regarding preferences cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of trusting behavior.
TR is considered to be a complex behavior that relies on the interplay of at least three different factors: risk preferences, social preferences, and beliefs about others' trustworthiness [Coleman, 1990; Fehr, 2009] . Risk preferences predict people's willingness to accept the risks associated with trust decisions [Fehr, 2009; Fehr and Camerer, 2007] . Social preferences, such as prosociality or betrayal aversion, imply that subjects derive extra utility/disutility from trusting/distrusting behaviors [Bohnet et al., 2008; Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004; Fehr and Camerer, 2007] . Finally, beliefs about others built through social priors (e.g., implicit racial attitudes, group memberships) or reputation on the basis of previous experiences (via trial-anderror learning) help people estimate the utility associated with the decision options and adjust their behavior for future interactions [Chang et al., 2011; Fareri et al., 2012; Fouragnan et al., 2013; King-Casas et al., 2005] .
Determining the different motives that lead participants to cooperate in behavioral IG experiments is difficult and remains to a certain extent purely theoretical. The reason is that the amount of money sent is the only proxy for trusting and reciprocating behaviors and it is difficult to capture the hidden motives behind participants' share/ keep decisions [Berg et al., 1995; Ermisch et al., 2009; G€ uth et al., 2000; McCabe et al., 2003] . Combining different economic games (e.g., Ultimatum Game and Dictator Game) with the IG may shed light on such motives [Chaudhuri and Gangadharan, 2007; Cox, 2004; Espin et al., 2016] . However, this approach should be taken with caution, for different games put participants in different mental r Bellucci et al. r r 1234 r frames. For instance, the Dictator Game may induce a generosity or helpfulness frame absent in the IG [Fehr, 2009] . Thus, the employment of other techniques (e.g., physiological measurements and neuroimaging methods) in conjunction with behavioral experiments will provide informative insight into the underlying neuropsychological processes implicated in trust and reciprocity decisions.
In particular, neuroimaging studies may contribute to this debate by unearthing the neural mechanisms involved in each IG stage. For instance, previous work combining the IG with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has shown anterior insula (AI) activation during trust decisions in the one-shot IG, which has been linked to aversive feelings related to betrayal aversion [Aimone et al., 2014] , while activations in the striatum have been observed during the feedback stage of the multiround IG, which has been associated with reinforcement learning [Delgado et al., 2005] .
However, single fMRI studies encompass several limitations. For instance, due to paradigm limitations, it is difficult to directly compare, in one experimental sample, neural activations underlying trust and reciprocity. Thus, fMRI studies have mainly provided isolated information about activations during either single IG stages or a couple IG stages (e.g., the trust and feedback stage) but only of the same IG version (either one-shot or multiround). Moreover, results of single fMRI studies are based on small sample sizes and suffer from low reliability [Feredoes and Postle, 2007; Raemaekers et al., 2007] . Thus, a detailed quantitative characterization of the consistent activation patterns across fMRI studies employing the IG is needed to uncover the neural underpinnings of TR.
In this study, we performed a coordinate-based metaanalysis employing the activation likelihood estimation (ALE) method [Eickhoff et al., 2009] in an attempt to clarify the following open questions. First, fMRI studies have revealed similar activation patterns in the AI during trust decisions in both versions of the IG [Aimone et al., 2014; Delgado et al., 2005; Kang et al., 2011; Krueger et al., 2008] , while striatal activity has mainly been reported in the multiround IG [Baumgartner et al., 2008; Delgado et al., 2005; Krueger et al., 2007] . Thus, our first aim in this meta-analysis was to test whether trust decisions engage different neural mechanisms in the two versions of the IG. Accordingly, we first identified consistent brain activations in the trust stage of the one-shot IG and the multiround IG, and then investigated common and different neural patterns of these stages. Moreover, activations in the AI and striatum have been found not only during the trust stage, but also the reciprocity and feedback stage of the multiround IG, respectively [Baumgartner et al., 2009; Chang et al., 2011; Fareri et al., 2015; King-Casas et al., 2005; Smith-Collins et al., 2013] . Thus, our second aim was to determine whether decisions to reciprocate and feedback learning involve different neural mechanisms. In particular, we first investigated consistent brain activations during the reciprocity and feedback stages and then explored how these neural patterns differ from those elicited by trust decisions in the multiround IG.
Based on the extant literature, we hypothesized that brain regions associated with aversion (e.g., the AI) may be consistently recruited by trust [Aimone et al., 2014] and reciprocity decisions [Chang et al., 2011] . Trust may evoke aversive feelings in the trustor due to the uncertainty about the decision outcomes (especially in the one-shot IG), while reciprocity likely elicits aversive feelings in the trustee because of the pressing requirement to comply with social norms (e.g., repayment of altruistic behaviors) [Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Read Montague et al., 2015] . In addition, decisions to reciprocate may consistently engage parietal regions associated with decision values (e.g., intraparietal sulcus [IPS] ), since such decisions require evaluations of the reciprocity options to properly repay a partner's behavior [Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr and G€ achter, 2000; McCabe et al., 2003] . Further, striatal activation may also be consistently observed during both the trust stage and the feedback stage of the multiround IG. Given the role of the striatum in reward prediction error and reinforcement learning, striatal activity may encode predictions about decision outcomes and representations of a partner's reputation [Apicella et al., 1991; Gregorios-Pippas et al., 2009; O'Doherty et al., 2004; Schultz, 2000; Schultz et al., 1997] .
MATERIALS AND METHODS

Literature Search and Selection
To identify candidate articles for our meta-analysis, a systematic online database search on PubMed, ISI Web of Science, and Google Scholar (up to the 29th February 2016) was performed using various combinations of relevant keywords, including: "trust," "trust game," "investment game," "trustor," "investor," "fMRI," "neuroimaging," "trustee," "trustworthiness," and "reciprocity." In addition, we explored several other sources, including: the BrainMap database (http://brainmap.org); work cited in review articles; and direct searches of the names of frequently occurring authors.
Inclusion Criteria
To be considered for the present meta-analysis, the following inclusion criteria had to be satisfied: (1) Studies included healthy participants free from psychiatric and neurological diagnoses or intake of medications (e.g., neuropharmaceuticals). Articles including patients were also selected if they reported results from a control group separately. (2) Experiments implementing one-shot or multiround versions of the IG, in which participants played the role of either trustor or trustee. (3) Articles combined the IG with fMRI techniques. (4) Articles reported whole brain analyses, while studies reporting results derived from ROIs or small-volume correction analyses were excluded in order to satisfy assumptions of the underlying ALE algorithm. (5) FMRI results were derived from a general linear model (GLM) based on either a binary contrast or parametric analyses. (6) Brain activations were reported in a standardized stereotaxic space (MNI, Talairach). MNI space was taken as reference standardized space for the present meta-analysis. Coordinates reported in Talairach space were converted to MNI space using icbm2tal provided with the GingerALE software [Brett, 1999] . (7) Each contrast included only a single IG stage of either one-shot or multiround IG.
Paper and Experimental Contrast Selection
Our systematic online literature research yielded a total of 30 articles employing the IG that met our inclusion criteria (Table I) . Twenty-three articles reported results for the trustor, 11 articles for the trustee, and 4 articles for both roles. For the trustor role, 5 articles were one-shot IG and 18 articles were multiround IG. Of these 18 multiround IG articles, 16 reported activations for the trust stage, 8 for the feedback stage, and 6 for both stages. For the trustee role, 4 articles were one-shot IG and 7 were multiround IG. Of these 7 multiround IG articles, 6 articles reported activations for the reciprocity stage, 2 for the feedback stage, and 1 for both stages (Table I) .
The final corpus provided a total of 79 experimental contrasts and 476 foci collected from 1,066 participants (Tables II-IV) . Of these 79 contrasts, 41 were reported for the trust stage among which 13 experimental contrasts were reported in the one-shot IG with a total of 52 foci across 130 subjects, and 28 in the multiround IG with a total of 129 foci across 457 subjects (Table II) ; 16 were reported for the reciprocity stage in the multiround IG with a total of 176 foci across 166 subjects (Table III) ; and 22 were reported for the feedback stage with a total of 119 foci across 313 subjects (Table IV) .
ALE Algorithm and Main Effect Analyses
The present meta-analysis was carried out using inhouse MATLAB scripts implementing the ALE algorithm for coordinate-based meta-analyses of neuroimaging results as described in the respective publications [Eickhoff et al., 2009 Turkeltaub et al., 2012] . ALE determines the convergence of foci reported from different functional or structural neuroimaging studies and tests if the clustering is higher than expected under the null distribution of a random spatial association between the results obtained in the studies [Laird et al., 2005; Turkeltaub et al., 2002] . The ALE algorithm interprets reported foci not as single points, but rather as three-dimensional Gaussian spatial r Neural Signatures of Trust in Reciprocity r r 1237 r probability distributions. These distributions refer to the spatial uncertainty of each reported focus. The main components of this uncertainty are the between-subject variance (due to small sample sizes) and between-template variance (due to different parameters used in imaging methods and data analysis of the single experiments), which are used to determine the width of the probability distributions [Eickhoff et al., 2009] . To note is that the ALE algorithm weights the between-subject variability based on the number of subjects that were analyzed in the studies and models thus larger sample sizes with smaller Gaussian distributions, presupposing that larger sample sizes should provide more reliable approximations of the "true" activation [Eickhoff et al., 2009] .
To characterize across-study consistent activations for trust in both versions of the IG, reciprocity and feedback learning in the multiround IG, ALE maps for the main effect of each IG stage were computed separately. The Friend Reciprocated > all other conditions 9.17 Fareri et al. [2015] Correlation with Prediction Error Signal 9.26 Fouragnan et al. [2013] No-Prior > Prior 4.91 Fouragnan et al. [2013] Consistent > Inconsistent 6.08 Smith-Collins et al. [2013] Expected > Unexpected Outcome 8.80 Smith-Collins et al. [2013] Reinforcement > No Reinforcement (for Expected Cooperation)
6.86
r Neural Signatures of Trust in Reciprocity r r 1239 r ALE maps as modeled activation maps were created by computing the union of activation probabilities for each voxel. This produced voxelwise ALE scores describing the convergence of results at each particular location in the brain. To distinguish "true" convergence from noise, ALE scores were assessed against a null-distribution of random spatial association between studies, allowing for randomeffects inference. The P values of the "true" ALE corresponded to the proportion of equal or higher values obtained under the null-distribution. The ALE maps were then thresholded at a cluster-level family-wise error (FWE) corrected threshold of P < 0.05 with a conservative clusterforming threshold of P < 0.001 using 10,000 permutations and an additional cluster-extent threshold of k > 90 voxels Eklund, et al., 2016] . Moreover, given the low number of experiments in our meta-analysis (specifically for the trust stage of the one-shot IG), we also considered only clusters as significant if: (1) their contributions came from at least 2 articles to avoid that only a single study may have driven our results; and (2) the most dominant experiment (MDE) contributed to the significant cluster on average less than 50% and the two MDEs (2MDEs) contributed on average less than 80% to meet criteria of robust, unbiased results as suggested by a recent simulation study . To determine experiments' contributions, the fraction of the ALE value accounted for by each experiment contributing to the cluster was computed. This average non-linear contribution of the experiment to the ALE value was calculated from the ratio of the ALE values at the location of the cluster with and without the experiment in question . As shown in Table V , no single experiment contributed more than 50% to any significant cluster (maximum contribution of the MDE 5 36.1%) and the sum of the contribution of the 2MDEs was overall under 80% (maximum contribution of the 2MDEs 5 65.9%).
Contrast and Conjunction Analyses
We investigated activation likelihood for three contrasts: (1) trust in the one-shot IG versus trust in the multiround IG; (2) trust versus reciprocity in the multiround IG; and (3) trust versus feedback learning in the multiround IG. Such differences were assessed by first calculating the voxelwise differences of the Z-scores obtained from the ALE maps computed in the previous main effect analyses. The experiments of either analysis were then pooled and randomly divided into two groups of the same size as the two original sets of contrasted experiments. The ALE scores for these two randomly generated groups were voxelwise subtracted from each other and recorded. This procedure was repeated 10,000 times, yielding an empirical null-distribution of ALE score differences between the conditions of each of the above contrasts. Finally, to control for false positives, the ALE maps of "true" differences were thresholded at a posterior probability of P > 95% and an additional cluster-extent threshold of k > 30 voxels [due to the low number of experiments and similarly to Cieslik et al., 2016; Langner and Eickhoff, 2013] . Lastly, we also performed conjunction analyses to test for convergent 
RESULTS
ALE Main Effect and Contrast Analyses
Trust stage
To investigate consistent activation maxima for trust in the two versions of the IG, analyses of the across-studies main effect for the trust stage of the one-shot and multiround IG were performed. In the one-shot IG, trust decisions consistently activated the right anterior insula (AI, BA 13/45) (Fig. 1a, Table VIa) , while trust decisions in the multiround IG consistently engaged the left ventral striatum (nucleus accumbens) (Fig. 1b, Table VIb) . Moreover, the ventral striatum was consistently more activated during trust decisions in the multiround IG as opposed to the one-shot IG (Fig. 2a, Table VIIa) . On the contrary, the right AI (BA 13/45) was found to be consistently more activated during trust in the one-shot IG than trust in the multiround IG (Fig. 2b, Table VIIb) , suggesting that trusting behaviors in one-shot and multiple interactions can be traced back to two cognitive processes engaging different neural networks. Five experimental contrasts (39% of the total experiments) contributed to the cluster in the right AI (MDE 5 26.3%; 2MDEs 5 48.5%) ( Table Va) , whereas 7 experimental contrasts (25% of the total experiments) contributed to the cluster in the ventral striatum (MDE 5 28.3%; 2MDEs 5 56.1%) ( Table Vb) .
Reciprocity stage
To investigate consistent activation maxima in the trustee during reciprocity decisions in iterated interactions, an (Fig. 1c , Table VIc ). The same regions were also found to be recruited more during reciprocity as opposed to trust in the multiround IG (Table VIId) . No suprathreshold clusters were found for the reversed contrast (i.e., trust vs. reciprocity in the multiround IG). Ten experimental contrasts (63% of the total experiments) contributed to the cluster in the right AI (MDE 5 18.5%; 2MDEs 5 34.6%); 6 experimental contrasts (38% of the total experiments) contributed to the cluster in the right IPS (MDE 5 21.6%; 2MDEs 5 41.4%); and, finally, 6 and 5 experimental contrasts (38% and 31% of the total experiments) contributed to the cluster in the fusiform gyrus (MDE 5 24.9%; 2MDEs 5 42.4%) and inferior occipital gyrus (MDE 5 26.9%; 2MDEs 5 52.8%) ( Table Vc) .
Feedback stage
To identify brain regions consistently activated when participants learn a partner's behavior, the main effect across studies of the feedback stage of the multiround IG was explored. Consistent activation maxima were observed in the right dorsal striatum (caudate nucleus), left external globus pallidus (GPe), and right cuneus (BA 18/17) (Fig. 1d , Table  VId) . Moreover, the ventral striatum was more active during the trust stage as opposed to the feedback stage in the multiround IG (Table VIIe) . On the contrary, the dorsal striatum was more active during the feedback stage as opposed to the trust stage (Fig. 2c, Table VIIf) , suggesting different roles for the dorsal and ventral striatum in the multiround IG. Thirteen experimental contrasts (59.1% of the total experiments) contributed to the cluster in the dorsal striatum Results from main effect analyses investigating regions consistently activated across studies during each stage of the IG. In parentheses, anatomical assignments from the SPM Anatomy toolbox. Lat, laterality; BA, Brodmann area; MNI, Montreal Neurological Institute; mm, millimeters; L, left; R, right.
r Bellucci et al. r r 1242 r (MDE 5 12.1%; 2MDEs 5 21.4%); 7 experimental contrasts (32% of the total experiments) contributed to the cluster in the GPe (MDE 5 17.1%; 2MDEs 5 34.0%); and 4 experimental contrasts (18% of the total experiments) contributed to the cluster in the cuneus (MDE 5 36.1%; 2MDEs 5 65.9%) ( Table  Vd) .
ALE Conjunction Analyses
Finally, three different conjunction analyses to test for convergent activations between paired IG stages were performed: namely, the conjunction between (1) the trust stage in the one-shot IG and the trust stage in the multiround IG; (2) the trust and reciprocity stages in the multiround IG; and finally, (3) the trust and feedback stages in the multiround IG. No suprathreshold clusters were found for any of these analyses, suggesting no overlapping brain networks between any of the IG stages.
DISCUSSION
We conducted a coordinate-based meta-analysis of 30 fMRI studies employing the IG, attempting to distinguish brain activations recruited by trust decisions in the two versions of the IG (one-shot and multiround). Moreover, we analyzed each stage of the multiround IG determining the differing neural patterns underlying trust, reciprocity, and feedback learning. Our results showed that trust decisions in the one-shot IG consistently engage the AI, previously associated with representations of aversive feelings. On the contrary, trust decisions in the multiround IG consistently engaged the ventral striatum, which has been involved in signaling reward prediction errors. This suggests that depending on the type of ongoing interaction, trust decisions are determined by different cognitive processes. Moreover, decisions to reciprocate in the multiround IG were found to consistently engage brain regions associated with aversion (AI) and decision values (IPS). These findings indicate that decisions to trust and decisions to reciprocate in multiple interactions recruit different brain regions and arguably rest on differing cognitive processes. Finally, the feedback stage of the multiround IG consistently activated the dorsal striatum, which has previously been associated with reinforcement learning and may play a role in processing behaviorally relevant information during social interactions.
Trust
In the one-shot IG, the trustor has to decide to share money with someone he will encounter only once. Although sharing may be beneficial for the trustor if the partner cooperates, decisions to trust in this context are highly risky because of the unpredictability of the partner's behavior. Moreover, the partner has a strong incentive to betray trust to gain the highest payoff from the transaction. This induces a state of uncertainty in the trustor, which has led to the hypothesis that trusting in Houser, 2012, 2013; Aimone et al., 2014; Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004] . In line with previous work, our meta-analysis identified consistent activation in the right AI during trust decisions in the one-shot IG. The insular cortex has traditionally been associated with mapping body-related sensations and feelings [e.g., pain, interoception; Craig, 2003; Craig et al., 2000; Critchley, 2005] . In particular, the posterior insula registers physiological sensations, while the AI provides a basis for subjective feelings and emotional awareness [Craig, 2002; Olausson et al., 2002; Zink et al., 2004] . Moreover, the left AI processes modality-independent aversive stimuli, while the right AI encodes modality-specific representations of aversive states [Corradi-Dell'Acqua et al., 2016; Preuschoff et al., 2008; Rilling et al., 2008] . In social contexts, AI activations have been associated with aversive emotional experiences such as unfairness [Sanfey et al., 2003; Tabibnia et al., 2008] , threat of punishment [Spitzer et al., 2007] , and anticipation of negative and unknown emotional events [Baumgartner et al., 2009; Herwig et al., 2007a Herwig et al., , 2007b . Further, activity in this region has been associated with representations of risk and uncertainty about decision outcomes [Paulus et al., 2003; Simmons et al., 2008] . A similar source of risk due to the partner's unpredictability is represented by decisions to trust in the one-shot IG. Activation in the AI during this stage may hence encode the sense of aversion evoked by the risk of betrayal [Aimone et al., 2014; Bartra et al., 2013; Bohnet et al., 2008; Stanley et al., 2012] .
On the contrary, if trustors and trustees interact repeatedly over the course of multiple exchanges, the trustor can form specific beliefs about the trustee's behavior and base his decisions on the reputation acquired by the partner in previous interactions. In this context, the initial uncertainty about the outcomes of a decision to trust is decreased, as the partner's behavior is no longer completely unpredictable. Indeed, our conjunction analysis of the trust stages of the two IG versions revealed no overlapping brain regions, suggesting differing brain patterns underlying these two trusting behaviors. Further, our main effect analysis revealed that trust in the multiround IG consistently activates the ventral striatum. The striatum has previously been observed to response to both primary (e.g., sex and food) and secondary rewards (e.g., monetary gains) [Elliott et al., 2004; Moll et al., 2006; O'Doherty et al., 2002; Pagnoni et al., 2002; Pfaus et al., 1995] . In particular, the ventral striatum has been linked to reward prediction error, signaling differences between expected and observed value at decision outcomes [O'Doherty, 2004; O'Doherty et al., 2004; Pessiglione et al., 2006; Schultz et al., 1997; Wardle et al., 2013] . Additionally, this region plays a pivotal role in social behaviors like pair bonding [Aragona et al., 2006; Young and Wang, 2004] and social altruism [e.g., donations to charity; Moll et al., 2006] . Specifically, the ventral striatum has been observed to be more engaged for social rewarding stimuli than nonsocial rewarding stimuli, for instance, when participants cooperate with a human partner relative to a computer partner despite identical monetary gains [Rilling et al., 2002 [Rilling et al., , 2004 . During trust decisions in the multiround IG, increased activity in the ventral striatum has been observed to be related to higher reward prediction error signals [Fareri et al., 2015] , suggesting that this region carries information about errors in reward prediction that enable estimations of the cooperative behavior of other partners [Sanfey, 2007] .
Reciprocity
Consistent activation in the right AI was found during reciprocity decisions. During such decisions, the trustee may be driven by self-interest considerations to defect and maximize his own payoff. However, defection implies betraying trust and violating a personal moral rule or a social norm (for instance, being rude to those who are kind to you), which can result in feelings of guilt [Haidt, 2003] . Guilt can act as a powerful motivator during social decision-making, steering behavior toward minimization of the negative feelings associated with it and ultimately encouraging a decision-maker to cooperate and act prosocially. Previous work has shown that the AI is most active when a personal norm is violated. For instance, this region is more engaged in prosocial individuals when they defect, whereas pro-self individuals engage the AI more when they reciprocate Singer et al., 2006] . Moreover, when participants face small offers that are perceived as unfair, AI activity is negatively related to offer size and predicts whether the offer is subsequently rejected [Sanfey et al., 2003] . Thus, when deciding whether to reciprocate, the trustee may consider betraying trust, which likely leads to anticipating feelings of guilt mediated by AI activation [Chang et al., 2011] .
Moreover, the IPS was consistently engaged during the reciprocity stage as well. Decisions to reciprocate imply evaluations of the decision options for a proper repayment of the partner's behavior (e.g., weighing the trustor's offer) [Fehr and G€ achter, 2000] . The IPS is generally associated with numerical processing and mathematical operations in both humans and nonhumans [Dehaene and Cohen, 2011; Dehaene et al., 1998 Dehaene et al., , 1999 Dehaene et al., , 2003 Krueger et al., 2011] and has long been linked to signaling reward values of decisions in monkeys [Louie and Glimcher, 2010; Platt and Glimcher, 1999] . Neuroimaging studies in humans have further demonstrated that this region similarly encodes the reward value of cues [Kahnt et al., 2014] . Further, increased activity in the IPS has been observed to be related to choices of delayed rewards as compared with immediate rewards [McClure et al., 2004] , suggesting higher activity in this region for more computationally demanding choices. Interestingly, in a multiround IG, the IPS was observed to be more engaged when trustees match partners' expectations about the amount of money they will return as compared with decisions to return less than what their partners would expect [Chang et al., 2011] . This region may thus encode processes related to the evaluation of the reciprocity options on the basis of the received offer (e.g., a fair or unfair offer) and the deferred reward value of the decision to reciprocate.
Feedback
Consistent activation in the dorsal striatum was observed when the trustor is informed about the partner's decision in the feedback stage of the multiround IG. The dorsal striatum contributes to action selection and initiation representing action-outcome associations in goal-directed behaviors [Atallah et al., 2007; Balleine et al., 2007; O'Doherty, 2004] . In particular, this region takes a role in learning about actions and their reward consequences [Balleine et al., 2007; O'Doherty, 2004; Tricomi et al., 2004] . In social contexts, activations in the dorsal striatum have been reported when participants cooperate [Rilling et al., 2002] or take revenge [De Quervain et al., 2004] and during acquisition of social reputation through trial and error [King-Casas et al., 2005] . Importantly, activity in this region has been found related to reinforcement learning during social interactions, but only when no reputational priors are available [unpredictable outcome; Fouragnan et al., 2013] . In contrast, no relationship between dorsal striatal activity and reinforcement learning has been observed when reputational priors are provided . Thus, in social contexts, the dorsal striatum may encode behaviorally relevant feedback information about action outcomes [Delgado et al., 2005; Elliott et al., 2004] . This may be particularly important when one's decisions have to rely exclusively on what one has learnt about the partner in the ongoing interaction. Hence, as opposed to the ventral striatum, which is likely more related to reward processing during trust decisions, the dorsal striatum may play a more central role in social behavior learning when feedback information about others' behavior is provided in iterated social exchanges. Interestingly, the conjunction analysis of the trust and feedback stages of the multiround IG revealed no overlapping activations in the striatum.
Limitations and Conclusions
Finally, some limitations have to be acknowledged. First, the pool of studies available for each IG stage was limited. For instance, we were able to identify only 13 experimental contrasts in the literature for the trust stage of the oneshot IG, which represents a much lower number than the one suggested by a recent simulation study for clusterlevel FWE thresholding [i.e., at least 17; Eickhoff et al., 2016] . However, we excluded clusters with contributions from only one article to avoid that our results be driven by an individual study. Moreover, analyses of the average contributions of each experiment to the significant clusters revealed that the average contribution of the MDE was less than half and the 2MDEs contributed on average less than 80% to each significant activation. These analyses confirmed that our results meet criteria for robust, unbiased results reflecting "true" convergence . Nonetheless, further neuroimaging studies are needed to increase the statistical power and to provide more solid results. Second, the ALE meta-analysis utilized only activation coordinates and subject counts from the fMRI studies, omitting fMRI-scanning parameters, data-analysis procedures and other potential variables that differed among studies and had an impact on results [e.g., contrasting healthy controls with patients: Gromann et al., 2013;  or having single or alternating trustor/trustee roles: Krueger et al., 2008] .
Despite these limitations, we were able to identify specific brain regions underlying TR. We showed consistent activations in the AI during trust in the one-shot IG and reciprocity in the multiround IG, arguably due to betrayal aversion and guilt aversion, respectively. Moreover, reciprocity also engaged the IPS, likely due to evaluation of the reciprocity options. As opposed to trust in the oneshot IG, no activation in the AI was found during trust decisions in the multiround IG. On the contrary, these trust decisions consistently engaged the ventral striatum, which signals reward prediction errors of decision outcomes. Finally, the dorsal striatum was consistently recruited during the feedback stage, suggesting that this region likely integrates information about previous social behavior and current rewards.
In conclusion, our results indicate that TR may represent a risky decision eliciting aversive feelings. However, when interpersonal trust is built through learning over multiple interactions, decision-makers may become more confident of their decisions and be more ready to cooperate. Importantly, recruitment of differing brain regions in the different IG stages suggests distinct cognitive processes underlying trust, reciprocity and feedback learning. Nonetheless, much remains to be elucidated. In particular, future effective and functional connectivity analyses of imaging data in combination with other techniques (e.g., TMS or pharmacological intervention) are needed to shed light on causal and temporal relationships among the brain regions we here unraveled. Providing coordinates of consistent activation maxima for each IG stage, this study may be of interest for those analyses relying on selection of regions of interest. Ultimately, we demonstrated that neuroimaging methods combined with meta-analyses of the neuroimaging literature are able to pinpoint the specific neural mechanisms of people's behavior and provide valuable and informative insight into the cognitive processes underlying behavioral differences [Van den Bos et al., 2009] . 
